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based on local conditions, prior use, and unconstrained by outside government mandates were most
effective in addressing not only the immediate threat of open-access, but in providing a longer-term
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“This is what stretched westward from the 100
th meridian, this complex, misunderstood 
two fifths of the continental United States where men had come before law arrived and 
where  before  there  were  adequate  maps  there  were  warring  interests,  white  against 
Indian, cattleman against sheepman and both against nester, open range notions against 
the use of the newly invented barbed wire, Gentile against Mormon, land rights against 
water  rights,  appropriation  rights  to  water  against  riparian  rights  to  water,  legitimate 
small settler against speculator and land-grabber. The public domain as Powell knew it 
was all of these, its only unity the unity of little rain.” (Wallace Stegner, 1954, Beyond 
the 100




I. Introduction.   
 
In addressing environmental and natural resource problems, there is a move away 
from primary reliance upon centralized regulation toward assignment of property rights 
of some sort to mitigate the losses of the “Tragedy of the Commons.”
1  For instance, a 
recent survey worldwide found that tradable use permits were used in 9 applications in air 
pollution control, 75 in fisheries management, 3 in water allocation, and 5 in land use 
regulation.
2 These institutional innovations have taken place as the resources have 
become more valuable, as they have faced growing open-access or common-pool losses, 
and as dissatisfaction has increased with existing regulatory policies.
3  
The advantages of property rights arrangements include better alignment of 
incentives for investment in the resource, provision of collateral for accessing capital for 
investment, more flexible exchange, greater information generation, and improved cost 
savings in meeting conservation or environmental objectives.
4 The more complete are 
property rights, the more the private and social net benefits of resource use coincide, 
reducing externalities and the associated losses of the common pool.
5    2 
Despite the attractions of property rights to address some resource and 
environmental problems, they remain controversial, limiting or slowing their adoption. 
Allocation especially is contentious because of the assignment of wealth and political 
influence associated with exclusive property rights. Property rights are political 
institutions and the underlying negotiations determine the nature of the rights 
arrangements that ultimately emerge, their timing, and effectiveness.
6 As emphasized by 
Coase (1960), allocation rules are always important for distribution and they affect output 
possibilities in the presence of transaction costs.   
Contemporary policy discussions about crafting responses to the common pool 
can receive guidance from research in American economic history on the development of 
property institutions on the frontier. I examine the assignment of private property rights 
during the 19
th and early 20
th centuries to five natural resources, mineral land, timberland, 
grazing and farm land, and water on federal government lands in the Far West. The 
region was richly endowed with natural resources, but assigning property rights to them 
required adaptation from established, eastern practices as defined by the federal land 
laws. The property rights that emerged and their long-term welfare effects provide a 
laboratory for examining current questions of institutional design to address over-fishing, 
excessive air pollution, and other natural resource and environmental problems. 
As the above quote suggests and as we will see, western institutions encountered 
many of the same information, political, and planning problems that are encountered 
today. Some were successful, whereas others were not.  A major lesson is that property 
rights allocations based on local conditions, prior use, and unconstrained by outside 
government mandates were most effective in addressing not only the immediate threat of   3 
open-access, but in providing a longer-term basis for production, investment, and trade. 
Western mineral rights stand out in this regard. In contrast, federal government limits on 
allotment size, use, and exchange had long-term negative consequences. Homestead 
distributions of 160 acres for farming only are the prime example.  
Another lesson is how hard it is to repair initial faulty property allocations. 
Whereas Coase emphasized transaction costs in private negotiations, political transaction 
costs are especially important in the assignment and subsequent modification of property 
rights.
7 Once an allocation rule is established, it becomes very difficult politically to 
modify. Many constituencies develop a stake in the status quo and the distributional 
implications of any change in it can be both large and uncertain. These factors complicate 
the development of bargaining positions in negotiations for institutional change.  
Moreover, these same problems raise the transaction costs of private efforts to make 
property rights structures more efficient.
8 Accordingly, path dependencies in property 
rules are real, and they have dominated the economic history of resource use in the West. 
II. Allocation Rules and Transaction Costs. 
There are a number of ways to assign property rights: 
First-possession. 
  First-possession assigns ownership on a first-come, first-served basis or first-in-
time, first-in-right. First-possession rules are attractive because they recognize incumbent 
parties, who have experience in exploiting the resource and hence, may be the low-cost, 
high-valued users.
9 Incumbents also have a direct stake in access to the resource and will 
be important constituents in a property rights distribution. These parties are concerned 
about any past investments in specific, non-deployable assets. By recognizing such   4 
investments first-possession rules encourage future outlays. Allocations that do not 
consider the position of incumbents will face opposition, raising the costs of rights 
assignment and enforcement. Grandfathering in initial allocation often has been a 
necessary ingredient in building the political support for property rights allocations.
10  
There are other reasons why first-possession rules can be efficient. They 
recognize first-movers, innovators, entrepreneurs, who initially experiment with and use 
a resource. Society benefits from innovative, risk-taking activities. Further, under first-
possession the market can determine optimal claim size, whereas under other allocation 
arrangements bureaucratic or political objectives may define the assignments. If these are 
not consistent with optimal production size, then further trade is required, and if 
transaction costs are high, such exchange might be limited. Hence, first-possession can 
economize on transaction costs.
11 
First-possession has been criticized on fairness grounds because it discriminates 
against new entrants, and existing holdings may be large. There are wide-standing views 
that “people should get what they deserve and deserve what they get.” If first-possession 
ownership is viewed as rewarding those who by luck and connections got early access, 
then it may be opposed politically.
12  
First-possession also has been criticized for leading to rent dissipation if 
homogeneous claimants race to establish property rights (Anderson and Hill, 1990). But 
if the parties are heterogeneous with respect to cost and the resulting rights are secure and 
permanent, then full dissipation will not occur. Moreover, the “winners” of such a race 
may be the most efficient producers.
13 First-possession rules often include beneficial use 
stipulations and these can instill heterogeneity by requiring that claimants place the asset   5 
into production. This requirement can act as a sorting device for potential claimants.
14 
There also are costs of measuring and verifying past use claims, and other potential rent-
seeking actions to secure the most favorable baseline period and criteria for allocating 
property rights. There are, however, costs with any rights allocation rule and there is no 
reason to believe that first-possession is more costly than other assignments. Generally, if 
the transaction costs of subsequent exchange are high, then it makes sense to assign rights 
to low-cost users with histories of past involvement in the resource. 
Uniform Allocation.   
Uniform sharing rules meet egalitarian goals by providing equal-sized allotments 
or equal opportunities. If there are no restrictions on subsequent exchange of property 
rights and transaction costs are low, there are few efficiency implications. The resource 
still migrates to high-valued users and to optimal production sizes. But if exchange costs 
are high, then inefficiently small (or large) distributions can persist. Uniform allocations, 
however, avoid the measurement costs of verifying claims of past production or of 
documenting precedence claims that are part of first-possession assignments. They also 
can circumvent the costly pursuit of or rush for property rights when first-possession is 
known to be the allocation rule. They work best when there are no incumbent users 
whose informal claims may not be consistent with more equal distributions.   
Auction. 
A third allocation mechanism is auction, and there are various types.
15 It can 
directly place the asset into the hands of those who have the highest value for the asset. It 
thereby avoids the transaction costs of re-allocation. Auctions transfer rents to the state 
(as the seller).  Auctions also generate information about resource values. As with   6 
uniform allocations, auctions work best for unallocated resources where there are no 
existing claimants and where resource values are high. By granting more of the rents to 
the state, auctions reduce the distributional implications of first-possession.  The amounts 
and distribution of rents, however, depend upon auction design, which can be complex. 
There are other costs to auctions. The state must be able to measure and enforce resource 
boundaries and the individual allocations that are auctioned off. The terms of the auction 
may also be influenced by competing claimants who lobby for rules that provide them 
with specific advantages.
16  It is often argued that auctions can transfer rents to the state 
without important distortions or incentive effects for resource users. But caution is in 
order. The effect depends on meeting restrictive conditions in auction design that may not 
be feasible.  In a similar setting, Johnson (1995) has shown that the imposition of taxes 
on quota rents in ITQ (individual transferable quota) fisheries could lead to reduced 
incentives of fishers to conserve (invest in) the fish stock.   
Transaction Costs. 
Property allocations are affected by transaction costs. They arise due to limited 
and asymmetric information about the open-access problem; the physical nature and 
value of the resource; and number and heterogeneity of the competing parties.   
Information and Transaction Costs.  
Garrett Hardin (1968, 1247) asserted that “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon 
by the majority of the people affected” in the form of regulations, prohibitions, or 
property rights would be agreed to because “the alternative of the commons is too 
horrifying to contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin.” But Hardin glossed over 
some key information problems. The losses of the commons and the design of the most   7 
effective arrangements to address them are not always so apparent to the people affected 
and information about those losses often is asymmetrically distributed and not easily or 
credibly conveyed from one party to another.  Hence, critical parties may not see the need 
for action. Others may adapt well to or benefit from open-access, at least in the short 
term, and resist what they believe to be unnecessary regulation.
17 
There typically are disagreements about the seriousness of the problem, as well as 
when and how it is to be addressed.  For these reasons, empirical regularities are that 
most environmental and natural resource commons dilemmas and (ex post) inappropriate 
institutions are not responded to until late when the problems have become very serious. 
By that time, disputes over their magnitudes decrease and the costs of not taking more 
appropriate actions swamp concerns over the distribution of the costs and benefits 
involved. Unfortunately, also by that time, many of the resource rents have been 
dissipated and the environmental losses made irreversible.
18 
Moreover, the private and political costs of adjustment can be very high, and the 
process can take a long time. Once property rights are assigned, individuals make 
production and investment decisions on the basis of them. Some involve fixed capital 
investments and other input obligations. Communities and other economic and political 
constituencies form around these practices and develop expectations for resource use and 
economic opportunity around them. More appropriate rights allocations may involve very 
different input mixes and production processes, requiring those who have had a stake in 
the old arrangement to adjust. But the economic alternatives for them may be very 
uncertain and limited, fueling political opposition to any change and demands for side   8 
payments. These political side payments in themselves change the rights structure that 
emerges.
19 
Resource Characteristics and Transaction Costs.  
More mobile or unobservable resources are associated with more uncertainty and 
with higher measurement and enforcement costs in assigning property rights. As a result, 
ownership is sometimes granted only to the flow of output (rule of capture) because 
extraction is more easily measured than is the stock. This is an incomplete assignment of 
property rights, however, and it can still lead to rent dissipation and premature depletion 
of the stock.     
More valuable resources also are associated with higher enforcement costs 
because there are more claimants and potential entry.  At the same time, as open-access 
losses increase for valuable resources, the returns to the assignment of property rights 
rise. Capturing a portion of rents that are saved is the motivation for individual parties to 
establish ownership institutions.
20  As outlined by Demsetz (1967) more valuable 
resources tend to have more precise property rights because the greater benefits from 
definition and enforcement offset the higher costs of doing so.  
Number and Heterogeneity of Competing Parties and Transaction Costs.  
Both of these factors raise the costs of assigning property rights. The larger the 
number of claimants, the greater is the potential for free riding, holdup, and defection. In 
contrast, smaller, more homogeneous groups are better able to find consensus on the 
allocation of property rights. This suggests that the assignment of ownership to new 
resources with no pre-existing claimants can occur at less cost than is the case for 
established resources with heterogeneous incumbent claimants and new entrants. Ostrom   9 
(1990) and others have shown that small homogeneous groups with frequent interaction 
can effectively reach agreement on resource allocation and use. These groups often use 
community property rules to mitigate open-access problems and enforce them through 
norms and customs. These arrangements, however, may not be sustainable in the face of 
exogenous increases in price and entry by large numbers of heterogeneous new 
claimants. 
III. American Land Policy and the Allocation of Property Rights: The Special 
Problems of the Far West.  
  
Early American land policy developed around agriculture with Northwest 
Ordinance of 1785, the various Pre-emption acts, other statutes that progressively 
lowered land prices, and most importantly, the Homestead Act of 1862 and related land 
laws.
21 Under that law any family head, who was at least 21 years old and who was a 
bona fide settler, could claim between 40 and 160 acres and upon paying fees and 
commissions and satisfying the 5-years continuous residence and improvement 
(cultivation) requirement, receive title.  
Federal land policy provided an ex ante, systematic framework for surveying, 
demarcating, and allocating government land to private individuals. The Midwest, where 
the policy most applied, was characterized by extensive areas of very rich soil, relatively 
flat terrain, abundant precipitation, and a temperate climate. Through 1880, about the 
time that the frontier moved beyond the 98
th meridian (Figure 1), millions of acres of 
federal land had been distributed for agricultural use to the states for schools, universities, 
and internal improvements, to railroads to subsidize their extension, and to individuals 
through sale, military warrants and scrip, and provisions of the public land laws.
22 
   10 
Figure 1 
The Far West 
 
Source:  Hansen and Libecap (2004a, 107). 
 
The Far West, however, was at once remote from established federal land policy 
and at the same time inhospitable to it.  There also were different resources beyond 
agricultural land that private claimants desired. Accordingly, when settlers followed the 
movement of the frontier across the continent, the new conditions they encountered 
required modification of established property rights policies. This situation allowed for 
local, private arrangements to emerge that in some cases were incorporated into state and 
federal law and remain in force today, whereas in other cases, they either were 
constrained by exogenous formal distributional mandates and or never developed 
officially due to limited information about appropriate production and allotment size. The 
lingering effects of these varying institutional responses for resource allocation and use 
were sharply different. They molded the economic history of western regions.     11 
IV. Mineral land. 
 
The development of private mineral rights on federal land has been more 
thoroughly examined than for any other western resource. Major works include those by 
Umbeck (1977a, 1977b, 1981), Hallagan (1978), Libecap (1978, 1979), Morriss (1998), 
Zerbe and Anderson (2001), Clay and Wright (2005), and Stewart (2006b).  
Western mineral rights developed abruptly with the discovery of gold in 1848 at 
Sutter’s Mill in California.
23  Within weeks thousands of prospectors poured in the area, 
and the population of California jumped from approximately 50,000 in 1848 to 89,000 in 
1849 and to 220,000 in 1852, with most concentrated in or near the gold region in the 
Sierra foothills.
24 These prospectors, however, had no official sanction to claim mineral 
land since it was not addressed in federal land law and initially, there was no civilian 
government to provide a legal framework for assigning property rights. As a result, 
miners devised local, private property arrangements within mining camp rules. For the 
next three decades or so, other prospectors followed as the gold and silver rush moved to 
Nevada, Montana, Colorado, Idaho, the Dakotas, and Alaska. Eventually, well over 600 
mining camps were established around the West.
25  
Since private mineral rights were based on local negotiations with virtually no 
outside constraint, the market determined the allotment mechanism, individual claim size, 
as well as conditions for exchange, maintenance, and enforcement of property rights. For 
this reason, western mineral rights provide a baseline for comparison with the other 
property rights arrangements described below.  
Mining camp rules were drafted quickly because the number of individuals in 
each area was small, and they had relatively homogeneous backgrounds and expectations.   12 
Further, there were high expected gains of avoiding disruptive conflict over mineral 
ground. Rules were drafted whenever 20 to 30 prospectors congregated in a new mining 
district, and Zerbe and Anderson (2001, 119) report that in cases the populations were 75-
90 percent American or of European origin. Reid (1980, 18) characterized most miners as 
possessing above-average levels of schooling, with many being doctors, lawyers, and 
other professionals. Umbeck (1981, 53) also noted that prospectors had the same limited 
prospecting skills and early on, none had information advantages regarding the location 
of ore.
26 By contrast, (Zerbe and Anderson, 2001, 135-136 and Stewart, 2006b, 21) point 
to the absence of cooperation in the Sonoran mining camp in California, which was 
populated by large numbers of Mexican and American miners, who had very different 
conceptions of cooperation, justice, and the law.    
First-possession to a single, specific location of mineral land was the allocation 
rule.
27 The first prospector to arrive at a location thought to have deposits of valuable ore 
was granted private claiming rights. Each party had, at least in principle, an equal chance 
at first choice of a spot. Accordingly, first-possession encouraged socially valuable 
search and exploration. And those who discovered a new district typically were granted 
two mineral claims, whereas all others were allowed a single claim. 
Each mining claim had to be marked and worked according to local mining camp 
rules. For example, one district in 1852 required miners to work their claims at least one 
day out of three during the mining season, and another in 1853 specified that a miner was 
to dig a ditch on his claim “one foot wide and one foot deep” within three days of 
locating a claim.
28 Abandoned claims could be occupied by others. In the meantime, 
others were prohibited from entry until the claim was deemed to be abandoned.
29     13 
Indeed, given the uncertainty of the location of ore, prospectors expected to locate 
and move numerous times before striking it rich, so that they needed a flexible way of 
obtaining and relinquishing the right to search for ore in any particular place (Clay and 
Wright, 2005). As uncertainty was reduced through ore discoveries, accommodating 
search became less important than supporting investment and production so that 
enforcement of valuable claims against trespass became more critical. Mining camp rules 
provided for procedures for arbitration of disputes and for punishing violators of the 
rules.  Most mining codes specified that property conflicts be resolved in courts before 




Although there was variation both across the mining camps and across time, 
mining codes always placed a limit on claim size that varied according to the type and 
expected value of the claim. Importantly, these claim sizes, however, were determined by 
local factors, not outside government requirements.  Smaller claims were allowed in 
potentially richer stream beds where gold was thought to concentrate and water for 
extraction was nearby, whereas larger claims were allowed on drier hill sides that offered 
lower prospects.
31 Enforcement costs were likely higher for the more valuable stream 
claims necessitating smaller individual holdings, than for the less attractive hillside 
claims. In the early period of a mining district’s development, all placer (surface) and 
quartz (deep vein) ore claims tended to be small, for example, 50 to 100 feet wide 
traveling to the center of a stream for placer claims and 200 feet slices along the exposed 
vein for quartz claims.
32 But mining camp rules were flexible, so that as ore played out, 
claim sizes were extended. 
While placer claims were bounded in terms of surface area, quartz claims were   14 
assigned to the ore veins themselves and were separate from surface ownership. Extra 
lateral rights were granted whereby the vein owner was allowed to follow the deposit 
wherever it traveled beneath the surface. Naturally, disputes occurred because of the 
limited information that existed about the location of subterranean ore. Moreover, veins 
frequently merged. Sorting through conflicting claims required action by the courts in 
determining who the wielded the legitimate property right.
33 
 In general there were no restrictions on the private sale of mineral claims. In the 
very early development of some mining districts there were limits on trading, possibly 
due to the costs of marking, enforcing, and exchange during a time of great uncertainty 
regarding the location of ore and associated movement of prospectors from point to point. 
But as conditions settled, sale became routine, first to allow entry to those without any 
land in the district and then, to consolidate claims for more capital intensive production. 
Some claims sold for a great deal and mining companies incorporated and sold shares on 
the San Francisco Stock Exchange and other western financial markets to raise capital.
34 
Camp rules initially were informal and gradually were given more structure as 
mining values rose, the number of claimants and congestion increased, and as the 
technology of mining and the nature of the ore and extraction changed.
35 They were 
incorporated into territorial and state law. For example, in 1851, the California 
Legislature recognized the rights of miners to establish their own rules regarding mining 
claims in an amendment to the Civil Practice Act. The amendment required that the 
courts should receive proof of the customs, usages, and regulations established in the 
mining camps unless they conflicted with laws of the state.
36 Libecap (1978) analyzed the 
refinement of Comstock Lode mineral rights over time by the Nevada Territorial and   15 
State Legislatures and Judiciaries as property values changed with new ore discoveries.  
Because of the remote location of the ore, the rapid spread of local rules and the 
high costs of dislodging them the Federal Government had little choice but to accept the 
mining camp practices in the Federal Lode Law of 1866 and the Mining Law of 1872 that 
provided for fee simple title.
37There also were no other competing constituencies for 
federal mining land. Ore discoveries preceded agricultural settlement in most areas, and 
in any case, mining regions generally were not suitable for farming.
38 This was not to be 
the case for other western resources, but it allowed miners a relatively open hand in 
forging local property rules and in galvanizing territorial and state legislatures and courts 
to respond to the demands of the mining industry and in obtaining federal recognition of 
their property rights.
39  
Mining involves high risks and costs in finding and developing ore deposits. Most 
sites turn out either to have no ore or not to be profitable. Moreover, there are significant 
fixed-capital investments with long lead times for extraction, transport, and refining that 
are vulnerable to unanticipated changes in prices and costs and to expropriation through 
high tax rates or government seizure. The American hard-rock mining law that developed 
out of the mining camps, however, provided secure ownership. There has been no history 
of high taxation, significant payments for receipt of title, or threatened nationalization. 
The accompanying security of property rights encouraged exploration and production. 
Further, American mining engineering schools and technologies became world leaders 
(David and Wright, 1997). The result, as emphasized by Wright (2006, 4-275-77), was 
that the mining industry grew and became a central contributor to the broader 
development of the American economy. Overall, U.S. industry became more mineral   16 
intensive in production than the country’s physical resource endowments would have 
otherwise suggested.
40   
V.  Range Land. 
 
Another group that settled the West early, faced new conditions, and had to 
institutionally innovate was ranchers. In the 1870s and 1880s, cattle herds were driven 
onto the western Great Plains by ranchers to take advantage of rich pasture lands. There 
was no specific provision in federal land policy for formal ranch claims. Accordingly, to 
avoid the losses of competitive overgrazing and to reduce conflict over land, ranchers, as 
with miners, divided the land on the basis of first-possession: “A custom has grown up 
and become thoroughly established among people of this community that once a stock 
man has developed water on and taken possession of the range by fully stocking the same 
that he will not be molested by other stockmen in his possession and enjoyment of such 
range.”
41  
The size and nature of rancher allocations were determined by the market through 
collective action within livestock associations.  Because of the broken terrain and limited 
precipitation, livestock carrying capacities of the western range were low. With 25 acres 
or more required to sustain a single cow for a year, upwards of 10,000 acres were 
commonly required in the West to support enough animals to achieve economies-of-scale 
in grazing.
42 These allotments certainly were beyond anything possible formally under 
the Homestead Act.
43 By contrast, it was possible to assemble huge ranches with fee 
simple title in Texas because federal land laws did not apply there. 
Initially, the lack of ability to obtain formal fee simple title to federal range land 
did not matter. Individual ranches were made up of a combination of fee simple holdings   17 
obtained under the land laws, as well as land purchases from railroads and state school 
land sections and much larger informal claims.
44 Local grazing rights included occupancy 
or beneficial use requirements. There were no restrictions on transfer. Patented ranch 
properties could be bought and sold and these included memberships in livestock 
associations.
45 
Dennen’s (1976) examination of livestock associations shows how they 
constrained entry and use of rangeland and that they were effective in controlling open-
access losses. The rules included restrictions on the number of animals that could be 
placed in common herds; limits on who could participate (only local ranchers with 
patented homesteads and locally-recognized rangeland claims); delineation of individual 
informal land holdings; registration of cattle brands; and specification of the labor each 
rancher was to contribute for managing the herd. Common herds were maintained to 
monitor the drift of livestock and to direct them to fresh grass stands; to control breeding 
within the herd; to cooperate in the branding of young animals; and to block entry by 
outsiders. There were annual cooperative roundups for branding and for collecting 
yearlings for sale. Livestock organizations reduced cattle mortality during severe winters 
by limiting grazing and thereby conserving winter pastures. Association membership was 
highly valued when it was transferred with ranch property upon sale.   
In the 1870s an invaluable tool for managing the location of livestock and entry of 
others onto the land was introduced. The barbed wire fence drastically reduced the cost of 
geographic control of cattle in a region where there were few trees and little wood 
available for traditional plank fencing (Anderson and Hill, 1975). With it ranchers fenced 
between 9 to11, 000,000 acres of the western range.
46   18 
The open range in the 1870s had few other recognized claimants, and it was far 
from established government.
47 By the late 1880s, however, with the entry of 
homesteaders, ranchers began facing new competitors who wanted to place the land into 
crops.  Conflicts over land began. There were opportunities to change the land laws to 
allow for larger allocations more in keeping with the requirements for successful 
ranching operations in the Far West. In 1878, John Wesley Powell in his Report on the 
Arid Lands of North America recommended 2,560-acre pasture homesteads, and two bills 
to carryout his recommendations were included.
48 But nothing came of them because 
they were politically unattractive.  
Powell’s suggested minimum distributions were 16 times the size of existing 
homestead allotments. The proposals were considered extreme. Federal politicians were 
reluctant to make major modifications in the land laws.
49 Their position was hardened 
after 1890s when the U.S. Census declared the frontier closed, indicating that there was 
less and less land available for new claimants.
50 Larger land allocations would only 
exacerbate the problem. Libecap and Hansen (2002) point out that there was no clear 
scientific understanding of the area’s climate or of the type of agriculture that would be 
effective there. The belief persisted that small Midwestern farms could take hold and that 
ranchers were blocking this process. A strong current of anti-monopoly bias in the 
distribution of property and a desire to maintain the homestead allotment at 160 acres 
prevailed.
51  
The Homestead Act was modified only slightly in 1904 with the Kinkaid Act that 
authorized 640-acre claims in western Nebraska; in1909 to allow 320-acre homesteads; 
in 1912 to reduce the residency requirement to 3 years; and in 1916 with the Stock-  19 
Raising Homestead Act that also allowed for 640 acres of grazing lands in other selected 
states.
52All of these changes, however, were still too small for a viable cattle ranch. 
Gradually, homestead claims were staked in the midst of rangelands, breaking up the 
ranches.
53  
The quasi-legal practices of ranchers were attacked and their fences removed by 
the General Land Office. As the ability of the associations to control entry declined, the 
incentives of members to violate internal rules increased, and the groups, along with their 
informal land allocations began to break down.
54 In the absence of fencing, the only way 
that ranchers could maintain their informal claims to land was to reduce the incentive to 
enter it by overgrazing: “The only protection a stockman has is to keep his range eaten to 
the ground and the only assurance that he will be able to secure the forage crop any one 
year is to graze it off before someone else does.”
55   
But overgrazing to mark and protect rangeland claims was costly. It made cattle 
herds more vulnerable to drought since grass stands were driven to low levels with little 
reserve when precipitation was scanty. The costs of overgrazing to define and enforce 
land claims against other potential users were reflected in lower calf crops, higher death 
losses, smaller cattle weights, and diminished animal values (Libecap, 1981a, 23-28). The 
lack of otherwise enforceable property rights to the range contributed to its deterioration 
as emphasized by the Department of Agriculture in its 1936 study of the condition of the 
western range resource.
56  
Because ranchers could not obtain title to semi-arid rangelands and because these 
lands ultimately also were inhospitable to homesteaders, approximately 80,000,000 acres 
in western states (excluding Alaska) were retained under permanent federal ownership   20 
with enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.
57 Most of the lands were placed in 
grazing districts and grazing permits or leases were distributed and managed by the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
58  This reservation of state ownership, pointedly, 
did not occur in Texas where the range was transferred to private claimants under state 
law.
59 
Since 1934, various political constituencies, ranging from ranchers to mining 
companies to conservation and recreation groups, have competed to influence agency 
policy over access and use of the public domain. Private grazing leases that had been 
transferable with ranch properties became more insecure as limits were placed on them 
and as lands were dedicated to other uses. The resulting tenure uncertainty affected 
grazing practices, investments, and rangeland values.
60  
Currently, the BLM administers some 177,053,843 acres of range land in the 
continental United States, almost a quarter of the acreage in 11 western states, including 
nearly 70 percent of Nevada, over 40 percent of Utah, and over 20 percent of Wyoming, 
Oregon, and Idaho.
61 The vast majority of these lands have no important amenity values 
or other critical externalities associated with their use that would justify government 
ownership and management.
62  They remain as a legacy of a federal land policy that held 
private distributions inappropriately small, limiting fee simple titling and the 
establishment of viable ranches based on it.  
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VI. Farm land.  
 
Unlike miners and ranchers, homesteaders could claim federal land using existing 
land policy. Individual ownership of a single plot of farm land was allocated under the 
Homestead Act and similar land laws through a combination of first-possession and 
uniform allocation. When setters found sites, they had to rush to file a “homestead entry” 
for 160 acres at the local General Land Office before it was claimed by others. There 
were beneficial use requirements so that each entry had to be occupied and improved for 
3-5 years before title could be obtained from the General Land Office. Abandoned claims 
were open to new entry.  160-acre distributions that had worked well in the Midwest and 
were applied in the West.
63 
Individuals were not to file homestead entries for sale to others. Applicants for 
title from the General Land Office were to swear that they: “did not apply to purchase the 
same on speculation, but in good faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive use and   22 
benefit; and that he has not directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract, with 
any person or persons whomsoever, by which title he might acquire from the 
Government…should inure” to others.
64 Once title was obtained from the General Land 
Office, however, prohibitions on sale could not be enforced. As a result, small homestead 
consolidation did take place, but only gradually.  Farmers who migrated to the Great 
Plains and Far West to stake homestead claims had few other employment options and 
this raised the transaction costs of exchanging their properties. Consolidation of farms 
often took place only at death or when the homesteader retired from farming.
65  
The Great Plains and Far West were semi-arid, with annual rainfall of 20 inches 
or (much) less and erratic distribution.
66 By contrast the Midwest was characterized by 
less variable precipitation of 30 inches or more. Nevertheless, migrants brought with 
them the cultivation practices, crops, and farm sizes that were familiar and successful in 
their areas of origin and so long as there was no drought, these actions worked well.  
Because homesteaders did not understand the climate and the eventual need for 
larger farms, they typically did not seek larger allocations nor did they lobby for major 
changes in the land laws.
67 Unlike miners and ranchers, homesteaders did not attempt to 
get around federal policies. Folk theories, such as “rain follows the plow,” where 
precipitation was believed to increase with cultivation, and pseudo-scientific farming 
prescriptions, such as “dryfarming doctrine,” where proper tillage was believed to 
overcome drought, were thought to make small farms viable despite the region’s dry 
climate (Libecap and Hansen, 2002).   
One consequence of these small-farm allocations was extensive farm failure.
68 
The region west of the 98
th meridian became known for periodic “homestead busts” when   23 
drought caused wheat yields (the most common crop) to collapse along with farm 
incomes. Homesteads did not have enough wheat in cultivation to offset the drop in 
yields and maintain a minimum family income. Small farms also typically did not have 
cropland in fallow, a practice that could mitigate the effect of drought by collecting 
moisture and nutrients while the land was left idle. Only larger farms could afford to keep 
land out of production. Additionally, homesteads were too small to diversify from wheat 
into livestock to smooth incomes. Libecap and Hansen (2002, 104) estimate that the 
drought in eastern Montana between 1917 and 1921 caused typical homestead net income 
to fall from $2,225 annually to -$114.   
Hansen and Libecap (2004a, 115) analyze the effect of drought on small 
homestead farms in three eastern Montana counties, Cascade, Carbon, and Fergus using 
county directories, dating from 1916 through 1930. Over 7,000 farms are in the data set. 
The analysis reveals that by the end of the period, the number of farms had fallen by 43 
percent and farm size had doubled as properties were abandoned and consolidated. In 
Cascade and Fergus Counties an average-sized farm in 1916 had a 2/3’s probability of 
failure during the drought years and chances were 4 out of 5 that they would not survive 
from 1916 through 1930.
69 By contrast larger farms tended to endure drought more 
successfully.  
Small, Great Plains farms not only were less likely to survive drought, but they 
were more vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations. Alston (1983, 888-95) shows that 
across the country mortgage debt and foreclosure rates were highest and average earnings 
were lowest on the northern Great Plains during the fall in commodity prices in 1921-40.    24 
The adjustment process toward larger farm sizes, however, took time. Over 60 
years of farm consolidation was necessary to achieve more optimally-sized farms on the 
Great Plains. Meanwhile, there was dramatic out-migration. The population of many of 
the 363 Great Plains counties peaked in 1910 and two-thirds had their largest populations 
in 1930 or earlier.
70    
A second consequence of small farm allocations was over cultivation and lack of 
investment in erosion control that had serious environmental effects with the Dust Bowl 
of the 1930s.  The Dust Bowl was a classic common-pool problem. Small homestead 
farmers cultivated more of their land to meet income targets, leaving it exposed to 
damaging wind erosion. They were less likely to adopt strip fallowing practices that 
could slow the flow of wind. Their farms were too small to internalize the benefits of 
downwind erosion control, and they bore high opportunity costs because strip fallow 
required between a third and a half of a farm to be left idle, a cost they could not bear.  
The large number of homesteaders also raised the costs of collective action to privately 
organize to combat erosion. Small farms were checker boarded across the land, 
surrounding somewhat larger farms, a condition that increased the potential for 
externalities from those farms that failed to practice erosion control. 
To effectively address erosion, all of the cultivated acreage in an area of 50,000 to 
500,000 acres or more would have to be “treated” with wind breaks and strip fallow. 
Even optimal farm sizes for production, estimated at 1,280 acres at the early 1930s, were 
too small.
71 Most farms on the Great Plains, however, were far smaller. Hansen and 
Libecap (2004b, 679-80) analyzed the relationship between farm size and fallowing using 
census data for 285 Great Plains counties between 1930 and 1964. They found that over   25 
the 35-year period mean farm size grew by 74 percent and the fallow share of crop land 
rose by almost a factor of 4. Later droughts in the 1950s and 1970s were not 
accompanied by the severe wind erosion that occurred in the 1930s.
72 The larger farmers 
that predominated by those years could internalize more of the returns from investing in 
erosion control through strip fallow investments, and they did so. 
Hansen and Libecap (2004b, 682) also found that counties with less fallowing 
(higher cultivation shares of total farmland) had more serious erosion, controlling for 
other natural factors. They argued that if the cultivation share had fallen by one standard 
deviation below the mean share (fallow had increased), the predicted probabilities of 
“no” or “light” wind erosion would have risen by 33 percent. Alternatively, if the 
cultivation share were raised to 100 percent (no fallowing), as was the case with many 
small homesteads, the predicted probability of “severe” wind erosion jumped by 123 
percent and the predicted probability of “no” wind erosion practically disappeared.  
VII. Timberland. 
In the East where there were large tracts of timberland, such as in the Great Lakes 
states, there were unrestricted cash and script sales of land by the Federal Government.
73 
But this was not the case in the West where the land effectively was reserved for 
agricultural settlement. Accordingly, those who claimed timberland in the West also had 
to innovate around the formal land laws. They did so by making first-possession “farm” 
entries to multiple 160-acre plots under the Homestead Act, Pre-emption Act, or the 1878 
Timber and Stone Act.  The Timber and Stone Act allowed individuals to purchase up to 
160 acres of timberland for $2.50 per acre for domestic use in buildings, fencing, or 
fuel.
74  Lumbering involved fixed capital investments in sawmills and spur railroad lines   26 
and other forms of transportation to move the logs to mills and lumber to markets. These 
investments needed a ready and continuous supply of saw timber. There also were 
economies-of-scale in cruising timber for the best stands and in harvest.  
To assemble enough forest land, lumber company officials negotiated with land 
agents who hired entrymen to occupy and “farm” the land until title could be obtained 
from the General Land Office. Once title was received, it was transferred to the land 
agent, who in turn sold the property to the timber company for a pre-negotiated price, 
usually $6 to $7 per acre.
75 Libecap and Johnson (1979, 136-8) analyze the costs of 
having to circumvent the land laws through fraud. The California Redwood Company 
used agents to hire 400 entrymen in 1883 to acquire 57,000 acres of land using both the 
Timber and Stone and Preemption/Homestead Acts. Because the entrymen could 
purchase the land directly under the Timber and Stone Act without occupation or 
construction of buildings, the evasion costs were less with that law than with the use of 
the more complex Preemption/Homestead process.  Libecap and Johnson found that the 
extra costs of deception were $670 per 160-acre plot under the Timber and Stone Act and 
$870 under the Preemption Act. These added costs were substantial, accounting for 
approximately 60 to 78 percent of the final sales price of $1,120 per plot paid by timber 
companies to the land agent for the property.  
Libecap and Johnson conjecture that if this case were typical and the same 
process were used to acquire the 4,000,000 acres of federal timberland transferred 
through the Timber and Stone and Preemption Acts at the six major land offices in the 
Pacific Northwest between 1881 and 1907, then fraud may have increased land 
acquisition costs by an additional $17 million and thereby delayed titling by up to 6   27 
years.
76 During that time the land would have been vulnerable to open entry and the 
illegal harvest of concern to early conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot, who became 
the first Chief Forester of the U.S. Forest Service in 1905.
77  
The Public Lands Commission of 1879 investigated the problem facing both 
ranchers and lumber companies in the West. In 1880 the Commission issued its report to 
Congress, calling for the reclassification and sale of the varied western lands according to 
their best uses, including the use of 2,560-acre individual allotments.
78 There was, 
however, no Congressional action. Instead, there was a gradual tightening of the land 
laws. The General Revision Act (Forest Reserve Act) of March 3, 1891 repealed various 
land laws, slowed the transfer of homestead titles, and created the National Forest 
Reserves.
79  
The law authorized the President “to set apart and reserve, in any State or 
Territory having public land bearing forests, in [sic] any part of the public lands wholly 
or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as 
public reservations.”
80 Under the new law, the Forest Reserves were to be permanently 
managed by the Federal Government with private timber harvest permits and grazing 
leases possible, but no longer fee simple title.  By 1900 over 46,000,000 acres were 
placed in the new reserves, and today, the National Forests and grass lands encompass 
193,000,000 acres, about the size of Texas.
81 As with BLM lands, the management of the 
National Forests by the Forest Service has been criticized for being excessively costly 
and dominated by constituent group politics.
82 Also, as with BLM lands, most National 
Forests have neither important amenity values nor significant externalities from land use   28 
that would merit government ownership. They too were retained by the government 
because of an inflexible land allocation policy.  
Figure III 




VIII. Surface Water. 
   
  In the Far West, surface water is allocated through first-possession under the 
appropriative rights system. This arrangement allows individuals to claim, move, and use 
water based on priority of claim.
83 Those with the earliest water claims have the highest 
priority and those with subsequent claims have lower-priority or junior claims. No two 
parties on a waterway have the same priority, so that there is a ladder of rights, ranging 
from lowest to highest in ranking. Water is not tied to the land, and therefore can be sold 
or leased separately from it.  
Under the appropriative rights system, individuals were granted usufructory or 
possessory rights to water, rather than fee simple title.
84 The sizes of their claims were 
based on the market. There were no outside restrictions on individual claims, except that   29 
each party could own only what could be placed into beneficial use. Because beneficial 
uses were difficult to measure, the basic test of meeting the requirement has been 
physical diversion. These use requirements and the absence of fee simple title to water 
likely reflected the extreme importance of water in the region. It could not be hoarded, 
wasted, or abandoned and still be owned. Any of these actions would result in water 
being assigned to the next priority claimant in a region of general water scarcity. 
Wyoming law, for example states: “Because water is so important to the economy of this 
state, its use is always limited by a concept of public trust; the only uses for which water 
rights may be established are those which receive ‘public recognition’ under the law of 
the state.”
85  
There were no restraints on transfer so long as no harm was inflicted on other 
diverters, who sequentially used some of the same water.  An upstream farmer who 
diverted water for irrigation consumed only part of it, with the remainder percolating 
through the ground back to aquifers, streams, or to ditches for repeated access by other 
downstream parties. Small water exchanges among miners or farmers within a watershed 
were therefore unlikely to have much impact on others. But larger trades that involved 
changes in the location, timing, or nature of use, were likely to have some external effects 
on others.  Removal of significant amounts of water out of a watershed reduced 
downstream flows and therefore decreased the water available for lower-priority 
claimants.  As a result, all western states have regulated such transfers. To mitigate 
adverse third-party effects, state water agencies typically allowed changes in diversion 
and location for only historical consumptive uses.
86   30 
The appropriative rights system is quite different from that which exists in the 
eastern U.S., where surface water rights are based on riparian land ownership.
87 Land 
owners have rights to access the water adjacent to or passing through their properties for 
reasonable use and they can utilize the water so long as doing so does not harm other 
riparian claimants down stream.
88 These rights are appurtenant to the land and are 
transferable only with it. The arrangement works well where precipitation and streams 
are plentiful and more-or-less uniformly spread.  
In the semi-arid Far West, however, where there is a general absence of water and 
what exists is irregularly located, there was a need for institutional innovation that would 
allow water to be claimed and transferred to settlement locations, often out of the 
watershed. For example, prospectors who located ore in remote mountain sites required 
more water for placer and hydraulic mining techniques than was available locally. 
Similarly, those farmers whose properties were not near major water sources required 
additional irrigation water to increase farm yields and to smooth them during drought.  
Western semi-arid conditions meant that water would have to be brought via 
aqueducts, ditches or canals to the locations remote from the point of diversion. And for 
this to occur, the system of water rights had to be modified from the riparian system. 
Appropriative property rights were developed through local contracting unencumbered 
by outside constraints, in much the same way as western mineral rights or livestock 
associations were formed.
89 Appropriative water rights were often incorporated into 
mining claims and codes and into mutual ditch companies or irrigation districts organized 
by irrigators to bring water to their properties.    31 
These local rules were recognized subsequently by the states.  The most arid 
western states—Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming—constitutionally or statutorily adopted the appropriative system.
90 States with 
more water maintained a hybrid system of both riparian and appropriative water rights--
California, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, North and South Dakota, and 
Texas.
91    
At the time of the development of the appropriative rights system, there were 
single, homogeneous constituencies in each area—miners in mining camps and farmers 
who typically were members of ditch companies or irrigation districts. They had similar 
interests in the diversion of water from streams to support economic development in 
mining and farming.  This condition allowed for the smooth development of the 
appropriative rights system.   
Appropriative water rights have supported the development of mining and 
agriculture in the semi-arid West. They provided security for investment in mining and 
agricultural water infrastructure, including elaborate irrigation networks provided by 
mutual ditch companies, irrigation districts and the Reclamation Service (later, the 
Bureau of Reclamation) to promote the region’s flourishing agriculture.
92   
The prior appropriation system also formed the basis for moving water from one 
location to another to provide for urban water supplies. Most dramatically, Los Angeles 
acquired the appropriative water rights held by Owens Valley farmers between 1905 and 
1935 and constructed the 250-mile Los Angeles Aqueduct between 1907 and 1912. The 
aqueduct cost $25,000,000; was an engineering marvel; and made the growth of Los 
Angeles as the largest metropolitan area in the West possible, providing as much as 80   32 
percent of the city’s water supply.
93 Other western cities, such as Las Vegas, Phoenix, 
San Diego, and Tucson also have purchased or leased agricultural water rights to meet 






On-going efforts to mitigate the losses of the commons in various environmental 
and natural resource settings have brought renewed consideration of the use of property 
rights arrangements. These include individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries, 
tradable emission permits in air pollution control, and exchangeable development permits 
in land use planning.  While attractive because of their ability to better link private and 
social net benefits in decision making than is possible with traditional command-and-
control regulation, property rights instruments face complicated institutional design and 
implementation problems.  
For example, disputes over the types and distribution of ITQs to be granted in 
U.S. fisheries resulted in a four-year moratorium on their expansion in 1996.
95 Five U.S. 
marine fisheries operate under ITQ regimes (as compared to over 40 in Canada): the Mid-
Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, the Alaskan halibut fishery, Alaska 
sablefish fishery, the South Atlantic wreckfish fishery, and Alaska crab fisheries. These 
ITQs are more limited and are a weaker property right than found in many other major 
fishing countries.
96 Some U.S. ITQs are reserved for community development and not 
granted to individuals. There also are formal limits on the size of individual quota 
holdings and their transferability. In the Alaska halibut fishery, for example, only 
transfers from larger to smaller vessel classes are permitted, and no individual is allowed   33 
to own more than 0.5 percent of the total quota. There are other controls on share 
consolidation to limit holdings and to maintain a targeted number of vessels in the halibut 
fleet.
97 ITQ policies are molded by distributional concerns and the political influence of 
small vessel owners and fish processors.   
These actions are quite similar to the constraints placed on homestead allocations 
and the rejection of the larger land claims of ranchers and timber companies. The 
experience on the western U.S. frontier helps to explain the political support for such 
restrictions, but also suggests that they may have unanticipated long-term consequences 
and weaken the ability of the ITQs to conserve the fishery stock and provide sustained 
financial benefits to fishers.    
Overall, the development of property rights to natural resources in the western 
U.S. in the 19
th century provides a number of conclusions about the design and allocation 
of property rights. One is that first-possession or recognition of existing resource use 
practices and allowing local conditions to determine production size is likely to be the 
most effective allocative mechanism. Its empirical regularity on the frontier suggests that 
first-possession has had important efficiency attributes. The most successful allocations, 
mineral rights, membership in livestock associations, and appropriative water rights were 
all determined locally.  
Outside government constraints on who could obtain property rights and 
mandates for uniform (small) allocations to meet distributional objectives had negative 
results for timber, range, and farm land. Small homesteads failed, stranding farm 
investments and necessitating out-migration. In their desperation to earn an income on 
farms that were too small, homesteaders over-cultivated and under-invested in erosion   34 
control with serious environmental effects. Ranchers and timber companies could not 
obtain title to sufficient range and timberland. By default much of the current federal 
holdings of 391,340,229 acres in the continental U.S. (21 percent of the total area) were 
left to long-term political and bureaucratic management as the “public lands.” Allocations 
and uses of those lands have shifted as the political influence of various interest groups 
has waxed and waned.
98Agency capture has encouraged subsidies and inefficient use, and 
uncertainty of control has reduced resource values and incentives to invest in the resource 
stock.  For the most part, this large, residual public domain represents an outcome that 
could not have been envisioned by Thomas Jefferson and the other early drafters of 
federal land laws.   
A second conclusion drawn from the Far Western frontier is how long property 
rights allocations endure, even in the face of accumulating evidence that some are ex post 
inappropriate. The private transaction costs of adjustment to new arrangements and the 
political transaction costs of changing property assignment rules are very high. Hence, 
there is opposition to change and pressure to maintain the status quo, resulting in path-
dependencies in property distribution patterns and use. A related, third conclusion is that 
substantial resource rent dissipation is tolerated because of the distributional implications 
of changing property rights allocations.  Only late in resource use, after many of the rents 
have been lost are institutional changes typically enacted, and even then, they will be 
incrementally and incompletely adopted to mitigate political opposition.   
Finally, the experience of property rights on the Far Western frontier reveals their 
critical importance in directing resource use, trade and investment. These benefits were 
recognized by the region’s early settlers who had to devise their own arrangements to   35 
meet new conditions and to avoid the potential losses of open access. In the most 
successful cases they were free to do so and in the other cases they were constrained by 
formal land policy with less positive long-term results. The rich and compelling 
economic history of the Far West has evolved around these different institutions and it 
provides valuable lessons for contemporary efforts to address the Tragedy of the 
Commons.   36 
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